A Muslim Divide in China


Uyghur Muslims face stricter controls on religion than Hui Muslims.

By: Rukiye Turdush 

File photo of Muslim Uyghurs praying at the Jame Mosque during Ramadan in Hotan in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

China says its laws provide equal religious freedom for Uyghurs and the country’s other main Muslim group, the Hui, but Uyghurs face stricter controls on religious education and worship and how they dress because of Islam’s links to their political identity, analysts say.

Islam flourishes in China’s Ningxia and Gansu provinces, home to many of the country’s 10 million Hui Muslims, where mosque-based schools offer religious teachings to adults and children.

Hui Muslims in other parts of China as well are also allowed to run religious schools.

But in the Xinjiang region in China’s far west, where the mostly Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uyghurs form an ethnic group 9 million strong, government policies bar women and anyone under age 18 from attending mosques.

Uyghur parents are forbidden to teach religion to their children at home, and private religious education is subject to harsh crackdowns.

Many Uyghurs believe China is practicing a double standard in its religious policy toward Uyghur and Hui Muslims.

Although the laws on the books were the same, in practice, policies vary for both groups, said Dru Gladney, an anthropologist at Pomona College in California.

“Chinese laws about religious freedom are very clear. But like any other good Chinese law, there is uneven enforcement,” he said.

“Xinjiang has strict religious freedom because the political situation of the region is much different than other regions.”

But officials maintain Uyghurs are not getting the short end of the stick.

The head of the government-sanctioned Islamic Association of Urumqi, in the Xinjiang capital, said this month that China allows equal religious freedom for Uyghurs and Hui Muslims.

“There is no difference in religious policy,” Keram told RFA’s Uyghur Service.

“Uyghurs enjoy the same religious freedoms as Hui Muslims do,” he said.

But he refused to comment on crackdowns on Uyghurs’ religious freedom, including harsh sentences for unauthorized Islamic study and police raids on illegal schools in the region.

Crackdowns and police raids

Six teenaged Uyghur boys who were arrested for studying the Quran on their own after school are now serving sentences of 8 to 14 years in jail, a Uyghur farmer in the area who wished to remain anonymous told RFA this month.

The boys, who were between the ages of 14 and 17 at the time, had been arrested in April 2010 in Hotan’s Keriye county, and are now being held in jails in Aksu and Yarkand far from their hometowns, he said.

In May this year, an 11-year-old Uyghur boy died under suspicious circumstances in police custody after being detained when police raided his teacher’s home in Korla prefecture where he had been studying the Koran with two other boys when police took him away.

In a separate incident weeks later, a dozen children in Hotan prefecture suffered burns after police using teargas and stormed a religious school where some 50 children were studying under “illegal preachers.”

Aside from restrictions on Islamic education and worship, Uyghurs are also subject to restrictions on traditional Islamic dress.

Chinese officials have denied there were such restrictions, which in theory are prohibited by laws protecting religious freedom.

Earlier this month, a Uyghur member of the Xinjiang delegation to the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s 18th congress in Beijing, Kurex Kanjir, said there is “absolutely no ban” on Uyghurs wearing traditional Islamic dress, according to the Hong-Kong based South China Morning Post.

Political identity

Hui Muslims, on the other hand, are much freer to practice Islam, although Hui Muslims in Ningxia suffered persecution during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and ‘70s.

Hui Muslims do not suffer the same level of repression as faced by Uyghurs because they have been much more assimilated into Chinese culture, says Uyghur writer Ghulam Osman.

“Hui Muslims are Chinese Muslims, but Uyghurs are not. Uyghurs are of a different race than the Chinese.”

“Hui Muslims have never been a nation-state; they always lived together with the Chinese, because they belong to the same ethnic group as the Chinese,” he said.

The Hui, whose forefathers hundreds of years ago were traders from Central Asia or other places who practiced Islam, live throughout China and, unlike the Uyghurs, many of them speak Chinese as their mother tongue.

The Hui are counted as one of China’s 55 distinct ethnic minorities, but are unique in that they are the only group to be defined solely on the basis of their religion, rather than language or genealogical differences. By definition, China’s Hui minority includes all historically Muslim communities in the country who are not members of other ethnic groups.

“Uyghurs are different; they had their own land and were invaded by China,” Ghulam Osman said, referring to Xinjiang’s past before it came under Chinese control following two short-lived East Turkestan Republics in the 1930s and 1940s.

China, fearing a separatist movement in Xinjiang, represses Uyghurs’ religious freedom because Islam is significant in the survival of their identity, he said.

But if China is worried about an independence movement blossoming among Uyghurs, such a movement would be more likely to be spurred in reaction to repressive religious policies than religion on its own, Gladney said.

“All the Uyghur movements against the Chinese government were caused by frustration that resulted from the heavy-handed repression of the Chinese government in the region, not by radical religious forces,” Gladney said.

But the political role of Islam in allowing Uyghurs to maintain an identity separate from the rest of China should not be underestimated, Ghulam Osman said.

“It is true that all political movements of Uyghurs are caused by the heavy handed policy of China and not by radical religious forces.”

“However, this does not mean religion does not play a significant role in Uyghur survival and Uyghur political movements,” he said.

“Islam and the Uyghur language are deeply embedded in Uyghur identity. They strengthen our racial and historical differences with Han Chinese.”

Reported by Rukiye Turdush for RFA’s Uyghur Service. Translated by Mamatjan Juma. Written in English by Rachel Vandenbrink.
From the Source

THE EMERGENCE OF ETHNIC ROHINGYAS


The term Rohingya is derived from the word Rohai or Roshangee, a terminology pervered to Rohingya. Rohai and Roshangee are terms denoting the Muslim people inhabiting in the old Arakan (Rohan/Roshang/ Roang). It is probably the corruption of Arabic term Raham (blessing) or Raham Borri meaning the land of God’s blessings.

The word Rahma to Rahmi-Rahmia-Rahingya to Rohingya, which denotes honest, dutiful, pitiful or kind hearted to others.

But there is another historical defination of Rohingya. That is Rohingya which derived from the Magh language “Rwa-haung-gya-kyia”. The Magh used to call the Pathan army of General Wali Khan and General Sandi Khan, who came to restore the throne to Narameikhia, as “Rwa-haung-gya-kyia”- which was changed time to time – as Rwahingyia – Rohingya-which denotes as brave as tiger. As the Pathans army defeated the

Mon-Talaing army, the Rakhine Maghs used to call the Pathan as brave as tiger. They mixed with the Arab descendants for centuries and become Rohingyas.

“Arakan, infect, a continuation of the Chittagong plain was neither purely a Burmese nor an Indian territory till the 18th century of the Christian era. Chiefly for its location, it was not only remained independent for the most part of history, but endeavoured to expand its territory in the surrounding tracts whenever opportunity came and Chittagong was the first to be the victim of the territorial ambition of the Arakanese monarchs.

…… Shut off from Burma by a hill range, it is located far away from the Indian capitals. The relation between Chittagong and Arakan is influenced by geographical, ethnological, cultural and historical considerations, from about 1580 A.D. nearly a century, Chittagong was under almost uninterrupted Arakanese rule which is undoubtedly an important period marked by momentous events.

“There were Moors, Moghuls and Pathans also in Arakan…. Thus, the Muslim population of Arakan consisted roughly of four categories, namely, the Bangalee, other Indian, Afro-Asian and native. Among these four categories of Muslims the Bengali Muslims formed the largest part of the total Muslim population of Arakan.”

The Arabs and Pathans army are founded the original nucleus of the Rohingyas in Arakan, who arrived from Arab and Bengal Sultanate during the time of Arakanese kings.

The Arabs were the first to lay the foundation of Muslim society in Arakan in the later part of the 7th century A.D. and the waves of immigration from Bengal were very significant, for with these immigrants came the Muslim nobels, statemen, traders, teachers, poets, and soldiers.

There had been large-scale conversion of the Hindus, Buddhists and animists to Islam who also constitute part and parcel of the Rohingya. In 15th century the number of converts to Islam soared, specially as the Muslims has established standard of credibility and stature in the community, initially through inter-mirrages.

These various migrations led to the admixture of blood and culture to form one common racial and linguistic classification to be known as Rohingya a term derived from “Rohang”, the ancient name of Arakan.

The Rohingya people developed a culture which was relatively advanced for that period. Schools, Madarasas were established, epics, ballads and riddles were advanced, music and dances were performed. This culture spread out all over Arakan. The Rohingya economy was also relatively developed. They developed agriculture, trade and commerce and extended their trade relation with neighbouring countries. Today the majority of the Rohingya people rely on agriculture as their base of subsistence; even Rohingya fishermen engage in agriculture during the non-fishing period.

Among the Muslim population of Chittagong two distinct ethnic characters are found; one is known as Chatgaiya and the other Rohai. Although professing the same religion they have different cultural habits. In fact the Rohais of Chittagong today are those Muslim people who fled Arakan (Rohang) as a result of Bunnan atrocities after the country was occupied in 1784 A.D. As many as 50% of the total population of Chittagong district are Rohais who trace their ancestoral origin to Arakan. The Rohingyas trace their origin to Arabs, Moors, Turks, Persians, Moghuls, Patthans and Bangalees.

Since Rohingyas are mixture many kinds of people, their check-bone is not so prominent and eyes are not so narrow like Rakhine Maghs and Burman. Generally they are broad shouldered, thin-bearded, a bit taller in stature than the Rakhine Maghs and Burmans but darker in complexion. They are some bronze coloured and not yellowish.

THE ROHINGYAS ARE A NATION

“From 1430 to 1531, for more than one hundred years, Arakan was ruled by the Muslims.” “Their Muslim Kingdom was independent in the 14th and 15th centuries. It was later absorbed by Burma” in 1784 A.D. The people of Arakan, the Rohingyas and Rakhines, had already organized their own statehood patterned after the Sultanate system of government current in those days. Thus in the context of Arakan the Rohingyas are not a minority but part of an integral whole. Today Rohingya nation exists because it is rooted in the direct personal feelings and the material interests of the large section of the Rohingya people whether in the homeland or in the places of refuge:

Aside from the compulsion of geography the Rohingya national identity is unique into Itself in terms of language and culture. The Rohingyas speak a common language and have common cultural trials. Almost all the Rohingyas are Muslims though there are a few Rohingya language speaking Hindus and Baruas. The Rohingyas are proud of their distinctive culture and language. They can not be classified cultural sub-group.

ROHINGYA HOMELAND

The Rohingyas inhabit a contiguous area and therefore have a separate territory which is the most crucial element in a national identity. The Rohingya populations in North Arakan are united by ancient heritage, a rich culture and distinct language. They have lived for many centuries within well defined geographical boundaries which demarcate their “Traditional Homeland”. The group identity of the Rohingya people has grown over the past several centuries, hand in hand with the growth of their homeland in North Arakan, where they worked together, spoke to each other, founded their families, educated their children and also sought refuge, from time to time, from physical attacks elsewhere in Arakan and Burma.

The Rohingyas were once in absolute majority in the whole of Arakan. But they have been exterminated in a systematic and planned way and their homeland has now shrunk progressively in insignificance or to semi-preservations — a process still evidenced. Planned increase in the Buddhist population systematically exterpate the Rohingya people and destroy the crucial geo-graphical link between areas in the whole of Arakan. It threatens the Rohingya’s claim to a contiguous homeland of the whole of North Arakan. The face of Rohingya homeland has been changed as the Rohingyas are helpless to check their demographic erosion. Despite systematic extermination of Rohingya population by means of genocidal actions and continued persecution, the Rohingyas still predominate in the area between the river Naf which demarcates the border between Burma and Bangladesh and river Kaladan, the longest river in Arakan. But the Rohingyas still claim that all those areas which have been inhabited by Muslims or atleast within their sphere of influnce before the pogram of 1942 are also included in their Traditional Homeland.

Arakan has always been a country with two nations within one geographic entity. Two different peoples, from the very ancient period, have been inhabiting Arakan. During the course of their settlements Arakan is divided into two parts : Muslim North and Buddhist South. That is the Rohingya homeland of North Arakan and Rakhine homeland of South Arakan.

Though Rohingyas live everywhere in Arakan and they are once majority in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Rathidaung, Akyab, Kyauktaw, Mrohaung and Minbya. Now, they are majority only in former Mayu Dist. and Akyab Island.

RELIGION AND SOCIETY

All Rohingyas profess Islam. They are strict followers of Islamic traditions. In every village there is atleast one mosque and one grave-yard.

Rohingya Muslims celebrate religious festivals with great joy and enthussasm. Great rejoicings marked the two Eids, Eidul-Fitr, and Eidul-Azha (Qurbani Eid). Eids prayers were generally offered at Eidgahs or Mosques (where there is no Eidgah) and the days were spent in feeding, feasting and visiting the houses of the neighbours and relations. They also visit graveyard for ziyarat who left them earlier. Zakat is paid by all solvent Rohingya people ordinarily during the month of Ramadan. Qurbani is offered by all according to their financial means. Shab-i-Maraj, Shab-i-Barat and Shab-i-Qadar were observed with prayer, devotion, alms-giving and feeding of the poor. Romadan is greeted by all Rohingyas with much religious fervour. The birth day of Hazart Mohammed (s.m.) was celebrated every year on 12th of Rabiul-Awal as known Uman-Nabi.

Though the Rohingyas lived together with Rakhine Maghs, they lived with their own culture.They never eat together. Inter-marriage also not so common. They live in separate villages.

Every compact village or a part of it formed a social unit with the mosque as its centre and a uniting force for the convenience and regulation of social life of the inhabitants of the area. The eldest, pious, and influential man in the society was recogonised as the head of village society (Samaj) who decide all disputes among them with the help of village elders.

DWELLING-HOUSES

In Arakan, Rohingya people live in somewhat densely packed villages and the majority of their houses are built of wooden pole, bamboo, thatched with palm-leaves (Dani) and stand on stilts as a protection against the floods that rise and surge under the monsoon rains.

At townships headquarters and at most villages of any size or importance a few brick houses are to be found in Arakan. In the large villages have a fair number of wooden houses with thatch (dani) or corrugated iron roofs.

OCCUPATION AND TRADE

The soil of Arakan is very fertile and the climate is ideal for rice cultivation. Arakan is dependent entirely on agriculture; all other occupations are subsidiary to, or exist for the maintenance of, the agricultural population. Of total Rohingya population 80% are occupied in agriculture or pasturing. The next order of numbers are those engaged in trade in food-stuffs. The third in respect of numbers are shop-keepers and followed by persons engaged in transport by water and by road, wood workers, fisherman, manufacturers of tobacco and salts.

MARRIAGE

Endogamy is a factor resulting in the practice of segmentation. In other words, endogamy reinforces ties of common descent. The Rohingyas practise endogamy.

In early days, a Rohingya would not be eligible for marriage until three voyages of trade by water or three trips of trade on land. Otherwise, he would be looked down by the society and would call him impotent with contempt.

The Rohingya would never marry with other non-Muslim without conversion to Islam. If one many without conversion to Islam, the Rohingya society would boycott them until and unless he or she embraees Islam. So, the Rohingya parents control their children and arrange marriage between the parents. If they eloped, after having love affairs, the Rohingya society used to condemn them.

Betrothal is arranged by the Rohingya parents. The bride and the groom are not allowed to meet before marriage. Family lines are thoroughly checked before the engagement. Engagement breaks if there arise dissension amoung the parents or guardians. Mohar is fixed by the parents or guardians of the bride and the groom and it is most essential according Islamic law. It must be given by the groom for the bride. Both the bride and groom must declare their willingness by pronouncing the words “Khawbul Ahsi” (we do agree) in front of at lest two witness and the molvi Shaheeb (Alim) who perform the mirrage. Divorce rate among the Rohingyas is less then other races of Burma. The wedding ceremonies are held in receptions as far as possible. The receiption diner is usually held by the family of the bride-groom. In special case called “Salami”, the reciption dinner is hold at bride home. During the wedding month the relatives of the newly wedded couple use to invite them and are served with at least one meal in consecutive days by each and every household of their relatives which shows their affections for the couple. In almost all Rohingya’s marriage ceremonies ‘Howlla’ (Group singing) songs sing and folk-dancing of girls and women are common.

FOODS

Rice is the staple food grain of Arakan. The diet of the Rohingya is simple rice, fish, vegetables and chillis; meat was taken on occasions. The majority Rohingyas eat dry fishes with fresh vegetables or potatoes or also without any of them. On all festive occasion cows, water-buffolos and goats were slaughtered for sales and distribution.

Rakhine Maghs like pork very much. Rohingyas never touch or eat pork. Pork is forbidden by Islam. They eat mutton, beef, chicken after making Halal according to Islamic teaching. Rohingyas honoured their special guests slaughtering a goat or more with their means and the poor with a chiken.

DRESS

The Rakhine Maghs males wear Gaung-Boung and Rohingyas males wear caps. The Rakhine Maghs wear Burmese jackets and Rohingyas wear coats. In olden days Rohingya used to wear Turbans of white clothes of 10 yards long and 1/2 yard breath. But British and Indian culture changed the dress of the Rohingya.

The male Rohingya wears a shirt with long sleeves called Bazu covering the upper part of the body while the lower part is covered a sheet of cloth stitched from side to side called longgi. Vest or gonji is wear as inner garment by the Rohingya male.

The adult female Rohingya wears long sleeved garment known as Suli to cover the upper part of the body while the lower part is covered with a Tami. Inner garment called Boduli long sleeve barazier wear every gril and woman of Rohingya. They wear a petticoat of cloth called Assar. This is without tie or fastening, but is broutht round the waist, with the edges well twisted in and kept on by the graceful curve of the hips. Young woman fastened a silk Belt called Rayshamer-Dowali and old women fastened a pice of red cloth 2.5 yards long and six inches wide stitched from side to side called Jali to hold their Tami on their waists.

She also wears a scarf known-as Romal which cover the head and shoulders. Whenever she is out-door she wears a Burkha, traditional veil covering the whole body.

RITES AND RITUALS

Some Rohingya males keep hair fallen on shoulders. They are mostly Molvis. The Rohingyas, on their brith, they keep the Islamic names in Arabic. Some prefer Burmese names or Rakhine Magh names at schools mostly where the teachers are Rakhine Maghs as they can not pronounce Muslim name correctly. Some keep both names such as, Saleh Tun Sein, Ahmed Maung Maung and so on. It is also not good. Muslim should take pride as the kings of Arakan used Muslim titles.

On the death of a Rohingya Muslim all the members of the society arranged his / her funeral as a social duty and hurried him/her in the graveyard with a prayer (janaza) according to Islamic Law.

Rohingyas are good natured people. They are honest. They are not oppressors. They can not tolerate the oppressors. They defend their people even not caring their lives. They are brave and intelligent people.

During the Second World War, the Rohingya fought for the Independence of Burma with courage. Though the Japanese easily conquered the Southern part of Arakan within a few days, the Japanese were unable to control the North-Arakan due to the defence strategy. Even the Japanese had to retreat failing to advance-through the defence operation of Rohingyas. The courage and bravery of Rohingyas should be recorded in Myanmar Razawin. As Rohingyas are always neglected people, their bravery was never recorded. Rohingyas respect laws and are peace loving people.

SPORTS AND GAMES

Rohingyas have may indigenous sports and games which are usually held during summer and winter. Some also in rainny season. They are Boli-Khela (wrestling), Ghari-Khela (Boat racing), Mohal Khela, Gila-Khela Du Du Khela, Qunda Khela (weight lilting of round stone), Dan Khela, Ulu Khela, Ciyar Khela, Luk-palani Khela, Phoni Khela, Mal-pat Khela, Bak-goru Khela, Bosgya-buri Khela, Morish Khela, Bat Khela, Kalatur Khela, Saws-sa-rani Khela, Dope-marani Khela, diving and swimming, Paddy transplanting competition.

SONGS AND MUSICS

The Rohingyas are fond of music (both vocal and instrumental) and dance. Rohingyas have their own folk songs, dances and musics. Howla songs sing by women in almost all Rohingya’s marriage ceremonies and also women dance their flok dences in the same ceremonies. Young women mostly used mouth orgen (Baza) while dancing.Bitayali Geet, Jari Geet and Gazir Geet are very music is very sweet and meladious. Those who had came across the Rohingya National Programme from the Burma Broadcasting Service (BBS), they may recall the art of the Rohingya music.

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

There is separate Rohingya language, literature and civilization. It developed through Islamic civilization. Rohingya language is a mixture of Arabic, Persian, Urdu, Bangali and Rakhine Maghs, because they are the people of border and as same as the people of other border of Burma.

In the year 1429 A.D. General Wall Khan introduced Persian as state language of Arakan and also introduced Qazi courts in Arakan. Rohingya language is not recent make up. Muslim writers and poets used to write in this language since the early days in Arabic and Persian alphabets. One of the book is still in the possession of the author (Tahir Ba Tha). In addition to this, the coins of Arakan were melted in Arabic and Persian and also there are numerous Kyauksa (stone inscriptions) carved in Arabic.

The Rohingya literature is considerly rich in ballads, love songs, Floktales, Baramasa, legends,mystic songs, proverbs, bewsans, riddles, lullabies (Auli) and so on.

There are many Rohingya poets and writers who flourished in the court of Arakan kings. The Arakanese kings had come under the influence of Bengal Sultans. Most of the their courtiers were Bengali speaking people from Bengal and neighbouring Chittagong region and they encouraged the cultivation of Bengali language. The poets and writers who wrote in Bengali and a good number of their poems and works have been discovered.

Some of the Rohingya poets and writers who flourished in Araka court are: Abdu Minyo or Ahmedu Minyo, Shah Barid Khan, Daulat Kazi, Mardan and. Shah Alawal.

Quraishi Magan, Abdul Karim Khandkar, poet Abdul Karim are also well known writers and poets of Arakan.

The British government also used Persian as the official language of Arakan till 1836 A.D.In addition to Rohingyas many Rakhine Maghs also learned Persians. For example- Seikky Thado Pe and U Aung Gyi. Later on Persian was replaced by English and Urdu.

Thus written languages of Rohingya, Persian and Bengali almost disappeared from Arakan during the later part of British rule. The British subtitued English, Urdu and Burmese in place of Rohingya, Persian and Bengali. The Rohingya used Urdu till 1945 British re-entry. Urdu language is rich in poetry and literature.

The kinds of birds can be differentiated with their feathers. So it is time for Rohingyas to establish their ancestral dress, literature and culture. Rohingyas are rich with fine-arts, music and architecture. Rohingya architecture resemble the Arab Saracenic style which is witnessed by the mosques of Arakan. Sandi Khan mosque was built with hard rocks and easier design which stood as the oldest Rohingya’s archeological monument.

So, it must be preserved by the Rohingyas.
Rohingyas should take pride for those Muslims who had built this mosque.

The Source

Uyghur Muslims: Victims of the World’s Largest Ethnic Cleansing


Uyghur Muslims: Victims of the World’s Largest Ethnic Cleansing.

 

 (Pic via Radio Free Asia)

China is carrying out a systematic campaign to ethnically cleanse up to 15 million Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, or rather what was East Turkistan until China began occupying and colonizing the region in 1949.

Moreover, China is sparing no effort to eradicate any memory or proof of Uyghur Muslim life. It is truly the stuff of dystopian nightmares, or a reenactment of the worst genocides carried out in the previous century. The handful of personal accounts that trickle out from behind China’s total control of the Internet and the media invoke memories of the Communist state’s darkest days — the period of the “Cultural revolution,” when religious people and sites were wiped from the country’s landscape.
For much of the 1970s and 80s, however, an increasingly open China softened its stance towards its religious and ethnic minorities, but this relative “openness” provided the space for minorities to express their economic, political, and religious grievances. When Uyghur Muslims renewed calls for a return to their independence, a status they enjoyed briefly as a sovereign state in the 1940, then known as the East Turkistan Republic, and as former neighboring Soviet states realized independence, China, fearing a growing separatist movement on its western frontier, began its crackdown on Xinjiang in the late 1990s.
China’s crackdown turned increasingly vicious when the United States declared its “War on Terrorism” in 2001, with China seizing the opportunity to erroneously portray Uyghur Muslims as one-part of the global Islamic insurgency, going so far to tie Uyghur nationalist dreams with the goals of the terror group al-Qaeda. In doing so, China gambled that it could pretty much do whatever it pleased to Uyghur Muslims, so long as it could dupe Western states into believing it, too, was at war with “radical Islam.” It’s the exact same kind of manipulative ploy successfully deployed by Israel, insofar as the manner the Jewish state mischievously conflates the Palestinian liberation struggle with “Islamic terrorism,” so it’s not like China needed to reinvent the proverbial wheel.
What began as a crackdown, however, has morphed into arguably the world’s largest state sponsored campaign of ethnic cleansing.
China has banned any form of expression of Islam in East Turkistan, forcing Uyghur Muslims to publicly denounce their faith and swear allegiance to the Communist state. Recently I posted on Twitter a video of Chinese authorities informing a group of Uyghur Muslims that it is now illegal for them to greet one another with the Islamic greeting, “Assalamu Alaykum.”
Islamic texts are also banned, including the Quran, as are beards that appear “abnormal,” i.e. too Muslim-y. Last year, China published a document titled, “Naming Rules for Ethnic Minorities,” which prohibits names associated with Islam, including Medina, Islam, Imam, Medina, Hajj, and others.
“In setting limits on the naming of Uyghurs, the Chinese government is in fact engaging in political persecution under another guise,” Dilxat Raxit, spokesman for the exile World Uyghur Congress group, told Radio Free Asia. “They are afraid that people with such names will become alienated from Chinese policies in the region.”
These are just a sample of a new tranche of restrictive and discriminatory measures that have come into force for those living in the region. Uyghur Muslims are now required by the government to have tracking devices installed on their cars and mobile phones.
But baby names, beards, and tracking devices are the least of problems faced by Uyghur Muslims in the face of brutal Chinese oppression, however. Torture, imprisonment, state sanctioned murder and forced disappearances have become the new reality in the Xinjiang area.
According to reports from human rights watchers, China has ordered its officials in Xinjiang to send almost half of its population to “re-education camps,” otherwise known as forced labor and indoctrination camps, the kind long associated with North Korea.
“We target people who are religious…for example, those who grow beards despite being young,” one Chinese government officer admitted in a report.
When I spoke to Abdugheni Thabit, a Uyghur Muslim journalist who now resides in The Netherlands, he told me that up to 1 million of his people are now in what he calls “prison camps.” Steven Zhang, a Hui Muslim who now lives in Houston, Texas, and who is suing the Chinese government for the murder of his Uyghur Muslim wife, described Thabit’s figure as “very conservative,” claiming, “Within the last 5 years at least 5 million Uyghurs were detained or secretly disappeared.”
Forced disappearances have become a notable and alarming trend in the past year or two. According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, Chinese security forces have forcibly disappeared at least 26 journalists, writers, bloggers, and human rights activists alone.
“Victims are often violently abducted, denied their right to due legal process and contact with loved ones or lawyers, and are at high risk of torture while in custody,” observes The Uyghur American Association.
All of which is happening out of the gaze of the international community, thanks largely to China’s control of the Internet and social media. Thabit told me he hadn’t heard from his Uyghur Muslim family in East Turkistan since 2009 as China controls all form of communication coming out of the area. All he knows is they were still alive in 2014, the year his sister, who lives in Washington DC, visited. Again, parallels to North Korea come to mind.
The situation in Xinjiang has “further deteriorated,” according to a statement issued by the US Congressional Executive Commission on China (CECC) earlier this month.
“Civilians are detained without cause, ‘political education’ camps proliferate, and a vast surveillance apparatus invades every aspect of daily life. These rights violations are deeply troubling and risk serving as a catalyst for radicalization,” said CECC chairman Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL).
Adding to the woes of Uygur Muslims is the absence of a friend anywhere in the international system. Traditional allies Turkey and Pakistan have been brought into China’s sphere of economic influence, and wealthy Gulf Arab states are too preoccupied with Iran, Qatar, or both.
If history is a guide, and should the existential woes of the Uyghur Muslims continue to fall on the disinterested ears of the international community, then one can be sure that where Chinese “re-education” and “assimilation” programs fail, mass extermination will likely follow.
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The 5 Pillars of ISLAM


The 5 Pillars of ISLAM

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Faith According to Islam

 

The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam by Allama Iqbal


The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam by Allama Iqbal

The Philosophical Test of the Revelations of Religious Experience

by Dr. Muhammad Iqbal
 
The Qur’«n is a book which emphasizes ‘deed’ rather than ‘idea’. There are, however, men to whom it is not possible organically to assimilate an alien universe by re-living, as a vital process, that special type of inner experience on which religious faith ultimately rests. Moreover, the modern man, by developing habits of concrete thought – habits which Islam itself fostered at least in the earlier stages of its cultural career – has rendered himself less capable of that experience which he further suspects because of its liability to illusion. The more genuine schools of Sufism have, no doubt, done good work in shaping and directing the evolution of religious experience in Islam; but their latter-day representatives, owing to their ignorance of the modern mind, have become absolutely incapable of receiving any fresh inspiration from modern thought and experience. They are perpetuating methods which were created for generations possessing a cultural outlook differing, in important respects, from our own. ‘Your creation and resurrection,’ says the Qur’«n, ‘are like the creation and resurrection of a single soul.’ A living experience of the kind of biological unity, embodied in this verse, requires today a method physiologically less violent and psychologically more suitable to a concrete type of mind. In the absence of such a method the demand for a scientific form of religious knowledge is only natural. In these Lectures, which were undertaken at the request of the Madras Muslim Association and delivered at Madras, Hyderabad, and Aligarh, I have tried to meet, even though partially, this urgent demand by attempting to reconstruct Muslim religious philosophy with due regard to the philosophical traditions of Islam and the more recent developments in the various domains of human knowledge. And the present moment is quite favourable for such an undertaking. Classical Physics has learned to criticize its own foundations. As a result of this criticism the kind of materialism, which it originally necessitated, is rapidly disappearing; and the day is not far off when Religion and Science may discover hitherto unsuspected mutual harmonies. It must, however, be remembered that there is no such thing as finality in philosophical thinking. As knowledge advances and fresh avenues of thought are opened, other views, and probably sounder views than those set forth in these Lectures, are possible. Our duty is carefully to watch the progress of human thought, and to maintain an independent critical attitude towards it.

As in other part of the book said

Scholastic philosophy has put forward three arguments for the existence of God. These arguments, known as the Cosmological, the Teleological, and the Ontological, embody a real movement of thought in its quest after the Absolute. But regarded as logical proofs, I am afraid, they are open to serious criticism and further betray a rather superficial interpretation of experience.
The cosmological argument views the world as a finite effect, and passing through a series of dependent sequences, related as causes and effects, stops at an uncaused first cause, because of the unthinkability of an infinite regress. It is, however, obvious that a finite effect can give only a finite cause, or at most an infinite series of such causes. To finish the series at a certain point, and to elevate one member of the series to the dignity of an uncaused first cause, is to set at naught the very law of causation on which the whole argument proceeds. Further, the first cause reached by the argument necessarily excludes its effect. And this means that the effect, constituting a limit to its own cause, reduces it to something finite. Again, the cause reached by the argument cannot be regarded as a necessary being for the obvious reason that in the relation of cause and effect the two terms of the relation are equally necessary to each other. Nor is the necessity of existence identical with the conceptual necessity of causation which is the utmost that this argument can prove. The argument really tries to reach the infinite by merely negating the finite. But the infinite reached by contradicting the finite is a false infinite, which neither explains itself nor the finite which is thus made to stand in opposition to the infinite. The true infinite does not exclude the finite; it embraces the finite without effacing its finitude, and explains and justifies its being. Logically speaking, then, the movement from the finite to the infinite as embodied in the cosmological argument is quite illegitimate; and the argument fails in toto. The teleological argument is no better. It scrutinizes the effect with a view to discover the character of its cause. From the traces of foresight, purpose, and adaptation in nature, it infers the existence of a self-conscious being of infinite intelligence and power. At best, it gives us a skilful external contriver working on a pre-existing dead and intractable material the elements of which are, by their own nature, incapable of orderly structures and combinations. The argument gives us a contriver only and not a creator; and even if we suppose him to be also the creator of his material, it does no credit to his wisdom to create his own difficulties by first creating intractable material, and then overcoming its resistance by the application of methods alien to its original nature. The designer regarded as external to his material must always remain limited by his material, and hence a finite designer whose limited resources compel him to overcome his difficulties after the fashion of a human mechanician. The truth is that the analogy on which the argument proceeds is of no value at all. There is really no analogy between the work of the human artificer and the phenomena of Nature. The human artificer cannot work out his plan except by selecting and isolating his materials from their natural relations and situations. Nature, however, constitutes a system of wholly interdependent members; her processes present no analogy to the architect’s work which, depending on a progressive isolation and integration of its material, can offer no resemblance to the evolution of organic wholes in Nature. The
ontological argument which has been presented in various forms by various thinkers has always appealed most to the speculative mind. The Cartesian form of the argument runs thus:
‘To say that an attribute is contained in the nature or in the concept of a thing is the same as to say that the attribute is true of this thing and that it may be affirmed to be in it. But necessary existence is contained in the nature or the concept of God. Hence it may be with truth affirmed that necessary existence is in God, or that God exists.’1
Descartes supplements this argument by another. We have the idea of a perfect being in our mind. What is the source of the idea? It cannot come from Nature, for Nature exhibits nothing but change. It cannot create the idea of a perfect being. Therefore corresponding to the idea in our mind there must be an objective counterpart which is the cause of the idea of a perfect being in our mind. This argument is somewhat of the nature of the cosmological argument which I have already criticized. But whatever may be the form of the argument, it is clear that the conception of existence is no proof of objective existence. As in Kant’s criticism of this argument the notion of three hundred dollars in my mind cannot prove that I have them in my pocket.2 All that the argument proves is that the idea of a perfect being includes the idea of his existence. Between the idea of a perfect being in my mind and the objective reality of that being there is a gulf which cannot be bridged over by a transcendental act of thought. The argument, as stated, is in fact a petitio principii:3 for it takes for granted the very point in question, i.e. the transition from the logical to the real. I hope I have made it clear to you that the ontological and the teleological arguments, as ordinarily stated, carry us nowhere. And the reason of their failure is that they look upon ‘thought’ as an agency working on things from without. This view of thought gives us a mere mechanician in the one case, and creates an unbridgeable gulf between the ideal and the real in the other. It is, however, possible to take thought not as a principle which organizes and integrates its material from the outside, but as a potency which is formative of the very being of its material. Thus regarded thought or idea is not alien to the original nature of things; it is their ultimate ground and constitutes the very essence of their being, infusing itself in them from the very beginning of their career and inspiring their onward march to a self-determined end. But our present situation necessitates the dualism of thought and being. Every act of human knowledge bifurcates what might on proper inquiry turn out to be a unity into a self that knows and a confronting ‘other’ that is known. That is why we are forced to regard the object that confronts the self as something existing in its own right, external to and independent of the self whose act of knowledge makes no difference to the object known. The true significance of the ontological and the teleological arguments will appear only if we are able to show that the human situation is not final and that thought and being are ultimately one. This is possible only if we carefully examine and interpret experience, following the clue furnished by the Qur’«n which regards experience within and without as symbolic of a reality described by it,4 as ‘the First and the Last, the Visible and the Invisible’.5 This I propose to do in the present lecture.
Now experience, as unfolding itself in time, presents three main levels – the level of matter, the level of life, and the level of mind and consciousness – the subject-matter of physics, biology, and psychology, respectively. Let us first turn our attention to matter. In order exactly to appreciate the position of modern physics it is necessary to understand clearly what we mean by matter. Physics, as an empirical science, deals with the facts of experience, i.e. sense-experience. The physicist begins and ends with sensible phenomena, without which it is impossible for him to verify his theories. He may postulate imperceptible entities, such as atoms; but he does so because he cannot otherwise explain his sense-experience. Thus physics studies the material world, that is to say, the world revealed by the senses. The mental
processes involved in this study, and similarly religious and aesthetic experience, though part of the total range of experience, are excluded from the scope of physics for the obvious reason that physics is restricted to the study of the material world, by which we mean the world of things we perceive. But when I ask you what are the things you perceive in the material world, you will, of course, mention the familiar things around you, e.g. earth, sky, mountains, chairs, tables, etc. When I further ask you what exactly you perceive of these things, you will answer – their qualities. It is clear that in answering such a question we are really putting an interpretation on the evidence of our senses. The interpretation consists in making a distinction between the thing and its qualities. This really amounts to a theory of matter, i.e. of the nature of sense-data, their relation to the perceiving mind and their ultimate causes. The substance of this theory is as follows:
‘The sense objects (colours, sounds, etc.) are states of the perceiver’s mind, and as such excluded from nature regarded as something objective. For this reason they cannot be in any proper sense qualities of physical things. When I say “The sky is blue,” it can only mean that the sky produces a blue sensation in my mind, and not that the colour blue is a quality found in the sky. As mental states they are impressions, that is to say, they are effects produced in us. The cause of these effects is matter, or material things acting through our sense organs, nerves, and brain on our mind. This physical cause acts by contact or impact; hence it must possess the qualities of shape, size, solidity and resistance.’6

Knowledge and Religious Experience

What is the character and general structure of the universe in which we live? Is there a permanent element in the constitution of this universe? How are we related to it? What place do we occupy in it, and what is the kind of conduct that befits the place we occupy? These questions are common to religion, philosophy, and higher poetry. But the kind of knowledge that poetic inspiration brings is essentially individual in its character; it is figurative, vague, and indefinite. Religion, in its more advanced forms, rises higher than poetry. It moves from individual to society. In its attitude towards the Ultimate Reality it is opposed to the limitations of man; it enlarges his claims and holds out the prospect of nothing less than a direct vision of Reality. Is it then possible to apply the purely rational method of philosophy to religion? The spirit of philosophy is one of free inquiry. It suspects all authority. Its function is to trace the uncritical assumptions of human thought to their hiding places, and in this pursuit it may finally end in denial or a frank admission of the incapacity of pure reason to reach the Ultimate Reality. The essence of religion, on the other hand, is faith; and faith, like the bird, sees its ‘trackless way’ unattended by intellect which, in the words of the great mystic poet of Islam, ‘only waylays the living heart of man and robs it of the invisible wealth of life that lies within’.1 Yet it cannot be denied that faith is more than mere feeling. It has something like a cognitive content, and the existence of rival parties— scholastics and mystics— in the history of religion shows that idea is a vital element in religion. Apart from this, religion on its doctrinal side, as defined by Professor Whitehead, is ‘a system of general truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended’.2 Now, since the transformation and guidance of man’s inner and outer life is the essential aim of religion, it is obvious that the general truths which it embodies must not remain unsettled. No one would hazard action on the basis of a doubtful principle of conduct. Indeed, in view of its function, religion stands in greater need of a rational foundation of its ultimate principles than even the dogmas of science. Science may ignore a rational metaphysics; indeed, it has ignored it so far. Religion can hardly afford to ignore the search for a reconciliation of the oppositions of experience and a justification of the environment in which humanity finds itself. That is why Professor Whitehead has acutely remarked that ‘the ages of faith are the ages of rationalism’.3 But to rationalize faith is not to admit the superiority of philosophy over religion. Philosophy, no doubt, has jurisdiction to judge religion, but what is to be judged is of such a nature that it will not submit to the jurisdiction of philosophy except on its own terms. While sitting in judgement on religion, philosophy cannot give religion an inferior place among its data. Religion is not a departmental affair; it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expression of the whole man. Thus, in the evaluation of religion, philosophy must recognize the central position of religion and has no other alternative but to admit it as something focal in the process of reflective synthesis. Nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other. They spring up from the same root and complement each other. The one grasps Reality piecemeal, the other grasps it in its wholeness. The one fixes its gaze on the eternal, the other on the temporal aspect of Reality. The one is present enjoyment of the whole of Reality; the other aims at traversing the whole by slowly specifying and closing up the various regions of the whole for exclusive observation. Both are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek visions of the same Reality which reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life. In fact, intuition, as Bergson rightly says, is only a higher kind of intellect.4

Read Complete Book

This book in Urdu

 

پاکستان کا مطلب کیا پڑھنے لکھنے کے سوا

’’آجکل ایک نجی ٹی وی پر ایک ایڈ آپ اکثر دیکھتے ہیں: ’’پاکستان کا مطلب کیا پڑھنے لکھنے کے سوا‘‘… جس کی تفصیل میں بتایا جاتا ہے کہ جب ہمارا ایک بادشاہ اپنی بیوی کی یاد میں تاج محل بنوا رہا تھا اُس وقت امریکا میں فلاں یونیورسٹی بن رہی تھی، اور جس وقت ہمارا ایک بادشاہ اپنے پالتو ہرن کے سوگ میں ہرن مینار بنوا رہا تھا اُس وقت برطانیہ میں فلاں یونیورسٹی بن رہی تھی۔ میری عرض یہ ہے کہ کیا ہم اپنے بچوں کو یہ بتانا چاہتے ہیں کہ ہمارے بزرگ عاقبت نااندیش اور ناسمجھ تھے؟ مجموعی طور پر اسلامی دنیا میں۔ حضرت صدیق اکبرؓ کے دور میں جب اسلامی لشکر کے جرنیل حضرت خالد بن ولیدؓ اور ابوعبیدہ بن الجراحؓ نے ایران اور روم فتح کیا، مساجد تعمیر کرائیں، یونیورسٹی کیوں نہیں؟ حضرت عمر فاروقؓ کے دورِ خلافت میں جب فلسطین فتح ہوا تو بجائے یونیورسٹیوں کے مسجدِ عمر کیوں بنوائی؟ ولید بن عبدالملک کے دورِ خلافت میں موسیٰ بن نصیر نے افریقہ اور طارق بن زیاد نے ہسپانیہ فتح کیا تو مساجد ہی کیوں بنوائیں، یونیورسٹیاں کیوں نہیں؟ ولید بن عبدالملک کے دورِ خلافت میں ہی جب محمد بن قاسم سندھ آئے تو فتح کے بعد مساجد کے بجائے یونیورسٹیاں کیوں نہیں بنوائیں؟ عباسی دورِ خلافت میں بغداد پوری دنیا کے لیے تعلیمی لحاظ سے مالامال تھا، تو کیا وہاں یونیورسٹیاں تھیں یا مساجد؟ اسلام کے رجلِ عظیم سلطان صلاح الدین ایوبی نے صلیبی جنگوں میں صلیبیوں کو شکست اور بیت المقدس کو آزاد کرانے کے بعد بھی یونیورسٹیاں کیوں نہیں بنوائیں؟ سلطان رکن الدین بیبرس نے ہلاکو جیسی آفت سے عالم اسلام کی گلوخلاصی کرائی، پَر کوئی یونیورسٹی کیوں نہ بنوائی؟ عثمانی تاجدار سلطان محمد نے قسطنطنیہ فتح کرنے کے بعد نیلی مسجد بنوائی، یونیورسٹی بنانے کا خیال کیوں نہ آیا؟ کیونکہ ان ادوار میں ہر مسجد ایک یونیورسٹی تھی، اسی لیے تو بغداد پوری دنیا کا تعلیمی مرکز تھا۔ اس کے علاوہ البیرونی، ابن الہیثم، بوعلی سینا جیسے عظیم لوگ کس یونیورسٹی سے فارغ التحصیل تھے؟ جہاں تک ہندوستان کا تعلق ہے، سلطان ناصر الدین محمود، سلطان شمس الدین التمش، جلال الدین خلجی اور علائوالدین خلجی نے بھی اس طرف کوئی توجہ کیوں نہ دی۔ میری عرض یہ ہے کہ فتح پور سیکری کی جامع مسجد میں جو یونیورسٹی تھی یورپ میں اس کی کوئی مثال اُس وقت نہیں تھی۔
مجھے یہ پڑھ کر لارڈ میکالے کے وہ جملے یاد آگئے جو اس نے برطانوی پارلیمنٹ سے خطاب کرتے ہوئے کہے تھے:
’’میں نے ہندوستان کے طول و عرض کا سفر کیا، مجھے ایک شخص بھی ایسا نظر نہیں آیا جو فقیر ہو یا چور ہو۔ میں نے اس ملک میں بے حد دولت دیکھی، اعلیٰ اخلاقی قدریں دیکھیں اور اعلیٰ پائے کے عوام دیکھے ہیں۔ میں تصور نہیں کرسکتا کہ ہم کبھی اس ملک کو فتح کرسکتے ہیں جب تک ہم اس قوم کی ریڑھ کی ہڈی نہ توڑ دیں۔ یہ اس قوم کی روحانی اور ثقافتی میراث ہے۔ اس لیے میرا یہ مشورہ ہے کہ ہم ان کا پرانا تعلیمی نظام یکسر بدل دیں، کیونکہ جب ہندوستانی اس بات کا یقین کرلیں گے کہ بیرونی اور انگلش چیز ان کی اپنی چیزوں سے بہتر ہے تو وہ اپنی خودمختاری اور اعتماد کھو دیں گے۔ پھر وہی بن جائیں گے جیسا کہ ہم چاہتے ہیں… یعنی ایک حقیقی محکوم قوم۔‘‘
مسلمانوں کی تاریخ پڑھتے ہوئے بہت سارے قارئین کو ایسا لگتا ہے کہ یہ صرف جنگ و جدل اور درباری سازشوں کی تاریخ ہے، لیکن مسلم تاریخ کے کئی ایسے روشن پہلو بھی ہیں جن سے ہمارے مؤرخین نے مجرمانہ غفلت برتی ہے۔ رہی سہی کسر نوآبادیاتی دور کے بعد پیدا ہونے والی غلامانہ ذہنیت نے پوری کردی، جو کسی بات کو اُس وقت تک مستند تسلیم کرنے سے انکار کرتی رہتی ہے جب تک مغرب کے کسی مصنف کا حوالہ نہ دیا جائے۔
تاجدارِ کائنات صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم کی بعثت سے تاریخِ انسانیت میں علم و فن، فکر و فلسفہ، سائنس و ٹیکنالوجی اور ثقافت کے نئے اسالیب کا آغاز ہوا اور دنیا علمی اور ثقافتی حوالے سے ایک نئے دور میں داخل ہوئی۔ آپ صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم پر نازل ہونے والے صحیفہ انقلاب نے انسانیت کو مذہبی حقائق سمجھنے کے لیے تعقل و تدبر اور تفکر کی دعوت دی۔ ’’تم عقل سے کام کیوں نہیں لیتے؟، ’’وہ غور و فکر کیوں نہیں کرتے؟‘‘ اور ’’جو لوگ آسمانوں اور زمین کی تخلیق میں غور و فکر کرتے ہیں‘‘ جیسے الفاظ کے ذریعے اللہ رب العزت نے اپنے کلامِ برحق میں بار بار عقلِ انسانی کو جھنجھوڑا اور انسانی و کائناتی حقائق اور آفاقی نظام کو سمجھنے کی طرف متوجہ کیا۔ اس طرح مذہب اور فلسفہ و سائنس کی غیریت بلکہ تضاد و تصادم کو ختم کرکے انسانی علم و فکر کو وحدت اور ترقی کی راہ پر گامزن کردیا گیا۔
محمد اقبال اپنی کتابThe Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam میں لکھتے ہیں:
لہٰذا تجرباتی طریقہ، عقل و استدلال اور مشاہدہ جس کو عربوں نے متعارف کروایا، وہ قرون وسطیٰ میں سائنس کی تیز رفتار ترقی کی وجہ بنا۔ بہت سے اہم ادارے جو قدیم دنیا میں موجود نہ تھے، ان کی بنیاد قرون وسطیٰ کی اسلامی دنیا نے رکھی۔ ان اداروں میں عوامی ہسپتال، امراض نفسیات کے ہسپتال، عوامی کتب خانہ، ڈگری جاری کرنے والی علمی یونیورسٹی اور فلکیاتی مرصد شامل ہیں۔ پہلی یونیورسٹی جس نے ڈپلومے جاری کیے، وہ قرون وسطیٰ کی اسلامی دنیا کی بیمارستان طبی ہسپتال اور یونیورسٹی تھی۔ یہ ڈپلومے نویں صدی میں جاری کیے گئے۔
بہرحال مسلم تاریخ کے روشن ابواب میں سے ایک ابوعلی الحسن بن الہیثم بھی ہے جو اُن سینکڑوں نابغہ روزگار ہستیوں میں سے تھا جنہوں نے ’’دور ظلمت‘‘ میں علم کی شمعیں روشن کیں اور ایسے محیرالعقول کارنامے انجام دیے جن کی وجہ سے ان کا نام آج بھی تاریخ میں سنہری حرفوں سے لکھا ہوا ہے۔
سب اتفاق کریں گے کہ آئزک نیوٹن دنیا کے عظیم ترین ماہر طبیعات تھے۔ کم سے کم اسکول میں ہمیں جو پڑھایا جاتا ہے اُس کے مطابق وہ جدید بصری علوم کے بانی ضرور تھے۔ اسکول کی کتابیں عدسوں اور منشور کے ساتھ اُن کے مشہور تجربات، ان کی روشنی اور انعکاس اور انعطاف کے عمل پر تحقیق کی تفصیل سے بھری پڑی ہیں۔
لیکن حقیقت شاید کچھ مختلف ہے۔ میں یہ باور کروانا ضروری سمجھتا ہوں کہ بصری علوم کے میدان میں نیوٹن سے پہلے ایک اور بہت بڑی ہستی سات سو سال پہلے ہو گزری ہے۔ مغرب میں اکثر لوگوں نے ان کا نام کبھی نہیں سنا۔
بلاشبہ ایک اور عظیم ماہر طبیعات جن کا رتبہ نیوٹن کے برابر ہے، 965ء میں اس علاقے میں پیدا ہوئے جو اب عراق کا حصہ ہے۔ ان کا نام تھا: ’’ابو علی الحسن بن الہیثم‘‘… ابن الہیثم کے نام سے مشہور ہیں۔ ان کی پیدائش عراق کے شہر بصرہ میں غالباً 354 ہجری اور وفات 430 ہجری (پیدائش: 965 ئ، وفات: 1039ئ) کو ہوئی۔


The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam by Allama Iqbal


The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam by Allama Iqbal

The Philosophical Test of the Revelations of Religious Experience

by Dr. Muhammad Iqbal
 
The Qur’«n is a book which emphasizes ‘deed’ rather than ‘idea’. There are, however, men to whom it is not possible organically to assimilate an alien universe by re-living, as a vital process, that special type of inner experience on which religious faith ultimately rests. Moreover, the modern man, by developing habits of concrete thought – habits which Islam itself fostered at least in the earlier stages of its cultural career – has rendered himself less capable of that experience which he further suspects because of its liability to illusion. The more genuine schools of Sufism have, no doubt, done good work in shaping and directing the evolution of religious experience in Islam; but their latter-day representatives, owing to their ignorance of the modern mind, have become absolutely incapable of receiving any fresh inspiration from modern thought and experience. They are perpetuating methods which were created for generations possessing a cultural outlook differing, in important respects, from our own. ‘Your creation and resurrection,’ says the Qur’«n, ‘are like the creation and resurrection of a single soul.’ A living experience of the kind of biological unity, embodied in this verse, requires today a method physiologically less violent and psychologically more suitable to a concrete type of mind. In the absence of such a method the demand for a scientific form of religious knowledge is only natural. In these Lectures, which were undertaken at the request of the Madras Muslim Association and delivered at Madras, Hyderabad, and Aligarh, I have tried to meet, even though partially, this urgent demand by attempting to reconstruct Muslim religious philosophy with due regard to the philosophical traditions of Islam and the more recent developments in the various domains of human knowledge. And the present moment is quite favourable for such an undertaking. Classical Physics has learned to criticize its own foundations. As a result of this criticism the kind of materialism, which it originally necessitated, is rapidly disappearing; and the day is not far off when Religion and Science may discover hitherto unsuspected mutual harmonies. It must, however, be remembered that there is no such thing as finality in philosophical thinking. As knowledge advances and fresh avenues of thought are opened, other views, and probably sounder views than those set forth in these Lectures, are possible. Our duty is carefully to watch the progress of human thought, and to maintain an independent critical attitude towards it.

As in other part of the book said

Scholastic philosophy has put forward three arguments for the existence of God. These arguments, known as the Cosmological, the Teleological, and the Ontological, embody a real movement of thought in its quest after the Absolute. But regarded as logical proofs, I am afraid, they are open to serious criticism and further betray a rather superficial interpretation of experience.
The cosmological argument views the world as a finite effect, and passing through a series of dependent sequences, related as causes and effects, stops at an uncaused first cause, because of the unthinkability of an infinite regress. It is, however, obvious that a finite effect can give only a finite cause, or at most an infinite series of such causes. To finish the series at a certain point, and to elevate one member of the series to the dignity of an uncaused first cause, is to set at naught the very law of causation on which the whole argument proceeds. Further, the first cause reached by the argument necessarily excludes its effect. And this means that the effect, constituting a limit to its own cause, reduces it to something finite. Again, the cause reached by the argument cannot be regarded as a necessary being for the obvious reason that in the relation of cause and effect the two terms of the relation are equally necessary to each other. Nor is the necessity of existence identical with the conceptual necessity of causation which is the utmost that this argument can prove. The argument really tries to reach the infinite by merely negating the finite. But the infinite reached by contradicting the finite is a false infinite, which neither explains itself nor the finite which is thus made to stand in opposition to the infinite. The true infinite does not exclude the finite; it embraces the finite without effacing its finitude, and explains and justifies its being. Logically speaking, then, the movement from the finite to the infinite as embodied in the cosmological argument is quite illegitimate; and the argument fails in toto. The teleological argument is no better. It scrutinizes the effect with a view to discover the character of its cause. From the traces of foresight, purpose, and adaptation in nature, it infers the existence of a self-conscious being of infinite intelligence and power. At best, it gives us a skilful external contriver working on a pre-existing dead and intractable material the elements of which are, by their own nature, incapable of orderly structures and combinations. The argument gives us a contriver only and not a creator; and even if we suppose him to be also the creator of his material, it does no credit to his wisdom to create his own difficulties by first creating intractable material, and then overcoming its resistance by the application of methods alien to its original nature. The designer regarded as external to his material must always remain limited by his material, and hence a finite designer whose limited resources compel him to overcome his difficulties after the fashion of a human mechanician. The truth is that the analogy on which the argument proceeds is of no value at all. There is really no analogy between the work of the human artificer and the phenomena of Nature. The human artificer cannot work out his plan except by selecting and isolating his materials from their natural relations and situations. Nature, however, constitutes a system of wholly interdependent members; her processes present no analogy to the architect’s work which, depending on a progressive isolation and integration of its material, can offer no resemblance to the evolution of organic wholes in Nature. The
ontological argument which has been presented in various forms by various thinkers has always appealed most to the speculative mind. The Cartesian form of the argument runs thus:
‘To say that an attribute is contained in the nature or in the concept of a thing is the same as to say that the attribute is true of this thing and that it may be affirmed to be in it. But necessary existence is contained in the nature or the concept of God. Hence it may be with truth affirmed that necessary existence is in God, or that God exists.’1
Descartes supplements this argument by another. We have the idea of a perfect being in our mind. What is the source of the idea? It cannot come from Nature, for Nature exhibits nothing but change. It cannot create the idea of a perfect being. Therefore corresponding to the idea in our mind there must be an objective counterpart which is the cause of the idea of a perfect being in our mind. This argument is somewhat of the nature of the cosmological argument which I have already criticized. But whatever may be the form of the argument, it is clear that the conception of existence is no proof of objective existence. As in Kant’s criticism of this argument the notion of three hundred dollars in my mind cannot prove that I have them in my pocket.2 All that the argument proves is that the idea of a perfect being includes the idea of his existence. Between the idea of a perfect being in my mind and the objective reality of that being there is a gulf which cannot be bridged over by a transcendental act of thought. The argument, as stated, is in fact a petitio principii:3 for it takes for granted the very point in question, i.e. the transition from the logical to the real. I hope I have made it clear to you that the ontological and the teleological arguments, as ordinarily stated, carry us nowhere. And the reason of their failure is that they look upon ‘thought’ as an agency working on things from without. This view of thought gives us a mere mechanician in the one case, and creates an unbridgeable gulf between the ideal and the real in the other. It is, however, possible to take thought not as a principle which organizes and integrates its material from the outside, but as a potency which is formative of the very being of its material. Thus regarded thought or idea is not alien to the original nature of things; it is their ultimate ground and constitutes the very essence of their being, infusing itself in them from the very beginning of their career and inspiring their onward march to a self-determined end. But our present situation necessitates the dualism of thought and being. Every act of human knowledge bifurcates what might on proper inquiry turn out to be a unity into a self that knows and a confronting ‘other’ that is known. That is why we are forced to regard the object that confronts the self as something existing in its own right, external to and independent of the self whose act of knowledge makes no difference to the object known. The true significance of the ontological and the teleological arguments will appear only if we are able to show that the human situation is not final and that thought and being are ultimately one. This is possible only if we carefully examine and interpret experience, following the clue furnished by the Qur’«n which regards experience within and without as symbolic of a reality described by it,4 as ‘the First and the Last, the Visible and the Invisible’.5 This I propose to do in the present lecture.
Now experience, as unfolding itself in time, presents three main levels – the level of matter, the level of life, and the level of mind and consciousness – the subject-matter of physics, biology, and psychology, respectively. Let us first turn our attention to matter. In order exactly to appreciate the position of modern physics it is necessary to understand clearly what we mean by matter. Physics, as an empirical science, deals with the facts of experience, i.e. sense-experience. The physicist begins and ends with sensible phenomena, without which it is impossible for him to verify his theories. He may postulate imperceptible entities, such as atoms; but he does so because he cannot otherwise explain his sense-experience. Thus physics studies the material world, that is to say, the world revealed by the senses. The mental
processes involved in this study, and similarly religious and aesthetic experience, though part of the total range of experience, are excluded from the scope of physics for the obvious reason that physics is restricted to the study of the material world, by which we mean the world of things we perceive. But when I ask you what are the things you perceive in the material world, you will, of course, mention the familiar things around you, e.g. earth, sky, mountains, chairs, tables, etc. When I further ask you what exactly you perceive of these things, you will answer – their qualities. It is clear that in answering such a question we are really putting an interpretation on the evidence of our senses. The interpretation consists in making a distinction between the thing and its qualities. This really amounts to a theory of matter, i.e. of the nature of sense-data, their relation to the perceiving mind and their ultimate causes. The substance of this theory is as follows:
‘The sense objects (colours, sounds, etc.) are states of the perceiver’s mind, and as such excluded from nature regarded as something objective. For this reason they cannot be in any proper sense qualities of physical things. When I say “The sky is blue,” it can only mean that the sky produces a blue sensation in my mind, and not that the colour blue is a quality found in the sky. As mental states they are impressions, that is to say, they are effects produced in us. The cause of these effects is matter, or material things acting through our sense organs, nerves, and brain on our mind. This physical cause acts by contact or impact; hence it must possess the qualities of shape, size, solidity and resistance.’6

Knowledge and Religious Experience

What is the character and general structure of the universe in which we live? Is there a permanent element in the constitution of this universe? How are we related to it? What place do we occupy in it, and what is the kind of conduct that befits the place we occupy? These questions are common to religion, philosophy, and higher poetry. But the kind of knowledge that poetic inspiration brings is essentially individual in its character; it is figurative, vague, and indefinite. Religion, in its more advanced forms, rises higher than poetry. It moves from individual to society. In its attitude towards the Ultimate Reality it is opposed to the limitations of man; it enlarges his claims and holds out the prospect of nothing less than a direct vision of Reality. Is it then possible to apply the purely rational method of philosophy to religion? The spirit of philosophy is one of free inquiry. It suspects all authority. Its function is to trace the uncritical assumptions of human thought to their hiding places, and in this pursuit it may finally end in denial or a frank admission of the incapacity of pure reason to reach the Ultimate Reality. The essence of religion, on the other hand, is faith; and faith, like the bird, sees its ‘trackless way’ unattended by intellect which, in the words of the great mystic poet of Islam, ‘only waylays the living heart of man and robs it of the invisible wealth of life that lies within’.1 Yet it cannot be denied that faith is more than mere feeling. It has something like a cognitive content, and the existence of rival parties— scholastics and mystics— in the history of religion shows that idea is a vital element in religion. Apart from this, religion on its doctrinal side, as defined by Professor Whitehead, is ‘a system of general truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended’.2 Now, since the transformation and guidance of man’s inner and outer life is the essential aim of religion, it is obvious that the general truths which it embodies must not remain unsettled. No one would hazard action on the basis of a doubtful principle of conduct. Indeed, in view of its function, religion stands in greater need of a rational foundation of its ultimate principles than even the dogmas of science. Science may ignore a rational metaphysics; indeed, it has ignored it so far. Religion can hardly afford to ignore the search for a reconciliation of the oppositions of experience and a justification of the environment in which humanity finds itself. That is why Professor Whitehead has acutely remarked that ‘the ages of faith are the ages of rationalism’.3 But to rationalize faith is not to admit the superiority of philosophy over religion. Philosophy, no doubt, has jurisdiction to judge religion, but what is to be judged is of such a nature that it will not submit to the jurisdiction of philosophy except on its own terms. While sitting in judgement on religion, philosophy cannot give religion an inferior place among its data. Religion is not a departmental affair; it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expression of the whole man. Thus, in the evaluation of religion, philosophy must recognize the central position of religion and has no other alternative but to admit it as something focal in the process of reflective synthesis. Nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other. They spring up from the same root and complement each other. The one grasps Reality piecemeal, the other grasps it in its wholeness. The one fixes its gaze on the eternal, the other on the temporal aspect of Reality. The one is present enjoyment of the whole of Reality; the other aims at traversing the whole by slowly specifying and closing up the various regions of the whole for exclusive observation. Both are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek visions of the same Reality which reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life. In fact, intuition, as Bergson rightly says, is only a higher kind of intellect.4

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This book in Urdu

 

پاکستان کا مطلب کیا پڑھنے لکھنے کے سوا

’’آجکل ایک نجی ٹی وی پر ایک ایڈ آپ اکثر دیکھتے ہیں: ’’پاکستان کا مطلب کیا پڑھنے لکھنے کے سوا‘‘… جس کی تفصیل میں بتایا جاتا ہے کہ جب ہمارا ایک بادشاہ اپنی بیوی کی یاد میں تاج محل بنوا رہا تھا اُس وقت امریکا میں فلاں یونیورسٹی بن رہی تھی، اور جس وقت ہمارا ایک بادشاہ اپنے پالتو ہرن کے سوگ میں ہرن مینار بنوا رہا تھا اُس وقت برطانیہ میں فلاں یونیورسٹی بن رہی تھی۔ میری عرض یہ ہے کہ کیا ہم اپنے بچوں کو یہ بتانا چاہتے ہیں کہ ہمارے بزرگ عاقبت نااندیش اور ناسمجھ تھے؟ مجموعی طور پر اسلامی دنیا میں۔ حضرت صدیق اکبرؓ کے دور میں جب اسلامی لشکر کے جرنیل حضرت خالد بن ولیدؓ اور ابوعبیدہ بن الجراحؓ نے ایران اور روم فتح کیا، مساجد تعمیر کرائیں، یونیورسٹی کیوں نہیں؟ حضرت عمر فاروقؓ کے دورِ خلافت میں جب فلسطین فتح ہوا تو بجائے یونیورسٹیوں کے مسجدِ عمر کیوں بنوائی؟ ولید بن عبدالملک کے دورِ خلافت میں موسیٰ بن نصیر نے افریقہ اور طارق بن زیاد نے ہسپانیہ فتح کیا تو مساجد ہی کیوں بنوائیں، یونیورسٹیاں کیوں نہیں؟ ولید بن عبدالملک کے دورِ خلافت میں ہی جب محمد بن قاسم سندھ آئے تو فتح کے بعد مساجد کے بجائے یونیورسٹیاں کیوں نہیں بنوائیں؟ عباسی دورِ خلافت میں بغداد پوری دنیا کے لیے تعلیمی لحاظ سے مالامال تھا، تو کیا وہاں یونیورسٹیاں تھیں یا مساجد؟ اسلام کے رجلِ عظیم سلطان صلاح الدین ایوبی نے صلیبی جنگوں میں صلیبیوں کو شکست اور بیت المقدس کو آزاد کرانے کے بعد بھی یونیورسٹیاں کیوں نہیں بنوائیں؟ سلطان رکن الدین بیبرس نے ہلاکو جیسی آفت سے عالم اسلام کی گلوخلاصی کرائی، پَر کوئی یونیورسٹی کیوں نہ بنوائی؟ عثمانی تاجدار سلطان محمد نے قسطنطنیہ فتح کرنے کے بعد نیلی مسجد بنوائی، یونیورسٹی بنانے کا خیال کیوں نہ آیا؟ کیونکہ ان ادوار میں ہر مسجد ایک یونیورسٹی تھی، اسی لیے تو بغداد پوری دنیا کا تعلیمی مرکز تھا۔ اس کے علاوہ البیرونی، ابن الہیثم، بوعلی سینا جیسے عظیم لوگ کس یونیورسٹی سے فارغ التحصیل تھے؟ جہاں تک ہندوستان کا تعلق ہے، سلطان ناصر الدین محمود، سلطان شمس الدین التمش، جلال الدین خلجی اور علائوالدین خلجی نے بھی اس طرف کوئی توجہ کیوں نہ دی۔ میری عرض یہ ہے کہ فتح پور سیکری کی جامع مسجد میں جو یونیورسٹی تھی یورپ میں اس کی کوئی مثال اُس وقت نہیں تھی۔
مجھے یہ پڑھ کر لارڈ میکالے کے وہ جملے یاد آگئے جو اس نے برطانوی پارلیمنٹ سے خطاب کرتے ہوئے کہے تھے:
’’میں نے ہندوستان کے طول و عرض کا سفر کیا، مجھے ایک شخص بھی ایسا نظر نہیں آیا جو فقیر ہو یا چور ہو۔ میں نے اس ملک میں بے حد دولت دیکھی، اعلیٰ اخلاقی قدریں دیکھیں اور اعلیٰ پائے کے عوام دیکھے ہیں۔ میں تصور نہیں کرسکتا کہ ہم کبھی اس ملک کو فتح کرسکتے ہیں جب تک ہم اس قوم کی ریڑھ کی ہڈی نہ توڑ دیں۔ یہ اس قوم کی روحانی اور ثقافتی میراث ہے۔ اس لیے میرا یہ مشورہ ہے کہ ہم ان کا پرانا تعلیمی نظام یکسر بدل دیں، کیونکہ جب ہندوستانی اس بات کا یقین کرلیں گے کہ بیرونی اور انگلش چیز ان کی اپنی چیزوں سے بہتر ہے تو وہ اپنی خودمختاری اور اعتماد کھو دیں گے۔ پھر وہی بن جائیں گے جیسا کہ ہم چاہتے ہیں… یعنی ایک حقیقی محکوم قوم۔‘‘
مسلمانوں کی تاریخ پڑھتے ہوئے بہت سارے قارئین کو ایسا لگتا ہے کہ یہ صرف جنگ و جدل اور درباری سازشوں کی تاریخ ہے، لیکن مسلم تاریخ کے کئی ایسے روشن پہلو بھی ہیں جن سے ہمارے مؤرخین نے مجرمانہ غفلت برتی ہے۔ رہی سہی کسر نوآبادیاتی دور کے بعد پیدا ہونے والی غلامانہ ذہنیت نے پوری کردی، جو کسی بات کو اُس وقت تک مستند تسلیم کرنے سے انکار کرتی رہتی ہے جب تک مغرب کے کسی مصنف کا حوالہ نہ دیا جائے۔
تاجدارِ کائنات صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم کی بعثت سے تاریخِ انسانیت میں علم و فن، فکر و فلسفہ، سائنس و ٹیکنالوجی اور ثقافت کے نئے اسالیب کا آغاز ہوا اور دنیا علمی اور ثقافتی حوالے سے ایک نئے دور میں داخل ہوئی۔ آپ صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم پر نازل ہونے والے صحیفہ انقلاب نے انسانیت کو مذہبی حقائق سمجھنے کے لیے تعقل و تدبر اور تفکر کی دعوت دی۔ ’’تم عقل سے کام کیوں نہیں لیتے؟، ’’وہ غور و فکر کیوں نہیں کرتے؟‘‘ اور ’’جو لوگ آسمانوں اور زمین کی تخلیق میں غور و فکر کرتے ہیں‘‘ جیسے الفاظ کے ذریعے اللہ رب العزت نے اپنے کلامِ برحق میں بار بار عقلِ انسانی کو جھنجھوڑا اور انسانی و کائناتی حقائق اور آفاقی نظام کو سمجھنے کی طرف متوجہ کیا۔ اس طرح مذہب اور فلسفہ و سائنس کی غیریت بلکہ تضاد و تصادم کو ختم کرکے انسانی علم و فکر کو وحدت اور ترقی کی راہ پر گامزن کردیا گیا۔
محمد اقبال اپنی کتابThe Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam میں لکھتے ہیں:
لہٰذا تجرباتی طریقہ، عقل و استدلال اور مشاہدہ جس کو عربوں نے متعارف کروایا، وہ قرون وسطیٰ میں سائنس کی تیز رفتار ترقی کی وجہ بنا۔ بہت سے اہم ادارے جو قدیم دنیا میں موجود نہ تھے، ان کی بنیاد قرون وسطیٰ کی اسلامی دنیا نے رکھی۔ ان اداروں میں عوامی ہسپتال، امراض نفسیات کے ہسپتال، عوامی کتب خانہ، ڈگری جاری کرنے والی علمی یونیورسٹی اور فلکیاتی مرصد شامل ہیں۔ پہلی یونیورسٹی جس نے ڈپلومے جاری کیے، وہ قرون وسطیٰ کی اسلامی دنیا کی بیمارستان طبی ہسپتال اور یونیورسٹی تھی۔ یہ ڈپلومے نویں صدی میں جاری کیے گئے۔
بہرحال مسلم تاریخ کے روشن ابواب میں سے ایک ابوعلی الحسن بن الہیثم بھی ہے جو اُن سینکڑوں نابغہ روزگار ہستیوں میں سے تھا جنہوں نے ’’دور ظلمت‘‘ میں علم کی شمعیں روشن کیں اور ایسے محیرالعقول کارنامے انجام دیے جن کی وجہ سے ان کا نام آج بھی تاریخ میں سنہری حرفوں سے لکھا ہوا ہے۔
سب اتفاق کریں گے کہ آئزک نیوٹن دنیا کے عظیم ترین ماہر طبیعات تھے۔ کم سے کم اسکول میں ہمیں جو پڑھایا جاتا ہے اُس کے مطابق وہ جدید بصری علوم کے بانی ضرور تھے۔ اسکول کی کتابیں عدسوں اور منشور کے ساتھ اُن کے مشہور تجربات، ان کی روشنی اور انعکاس اور انعطاف کے عمل پر تحقیق کی تفصیل سے بھری پڑی ہیں۔
لیکن حقیقت شاید کچھ مختلف ہے۔ میں یہ باور کروانا ضروری سمجھتا ہوں کہ بصری علوم کے میدان میں نیوٹن سے پہلے ایک اور بہت بڑی ہستی سات سو سال پہلے ہو گزری ہے۔ مغرب میں اکثر لوگوں نے ان کا نام کبھی نہیں سنا۔
بلاشبہ ایک اور عظیم ماہر طبیعات جن کا رتبہ نیوٹن کے برابر ہے، 965ء میں اس علاقے میں پیدا ہوئے جو اب عراق کا حصہ ہے۔ ان کا نام تھا: ’’ابو علی الحسن بن الہیثم‘‘… ابن الہیثم کے نام سے مشہور ہیں۔ ان کی پیدائش عراق کے شہر بصرہ میں غالباً 354 ہجری اور وفات 430 ہجری (پیدائش: 965 ئ، وفات: 1039ئ) کو ہوئی۔


Human Brain Analysis – Man vs. Woman


Human Brain Analysis – Man vs. Woman


Men and Women Equality and Women

Mother the biggest gift of Allah to us:Women and Islam

http://quran.com/2/29-39

1. MULTI-TASKING

Women – Multiple process

Womens brains designed to concentrate multiple task at a time.
Women can Watch a TV and Talk over phone and cook.
Men – Single Process
Mens brains designed to concentrate only one work at a time. Men can not watch TV and talk over the phone at the same time. they stop the TV while Talking. They can either watch TV or talk over the phone or cook.

2. LANGUAGE

Women can easily learn many languages. But can not find solutions to problems. Men can not easily learn languages, they can easily solve problems. That’s why in average a 3 years old girl has three times higher vocabulary than a 3 yeard old boy.

3. ANALYTICAL SKILLS

Mens brains has a lot of space for handling the analytical process. They can analyze and find the solution for a process and design a map of a building easily. But If a complex map is viewed by women, they can not understand it. Women can not understand the details of a map easily, For them it is just a dump of lines on a paper.

4. CAR DRIVING.

While driving a car, mans analytical spaces are used in his brain. He can drive a car fastly. If he sees an object at long distance, immediately his brain classifies the object (bus or van or car) direction and speed of the object and he drives accordingly. Where woman take a long time to recognize the object direction/ speed. Mans single process mind stops the audio in the car (if any), then concentrates only on driving.

5. LYING

When men lie to women face to face, they get caught easily. Womans super natural brain observes facial expression 70%, body language 20% and words coming from the mouth 10%. Mens brain does not have this. Women easily lie to men face to face.
So guys, do not lie face to face.

6. PROBLEMS SOLVING

If a man have a lot of problems, his brain clearly classifies the problems and puts them in individual rooms in the brain and then finds the solution one by one. You can see many guys looking at the sky for a long time. If a woman has a lot of problems, her brain can not classify the problems. she wants some one to hear that. After telling everything to a person she goes happily to bed. She does not worry about the problems being solved or not.

7. WHAT THEY WANT

Men want status, success, solutions, big process, etc… But Women want relationship, friends, family, etc…

8. UNHAPPINESS

If women are unhappy with their relations, they can not concentrate on their work. If men are unhappy with their work, they can not concentrate on the relations.

9. SPEECH

Women use indirect language in speech. But Men use direct language.

10. HANDLING EMOTION

Women talk a lot without thinking. Men act a lot without thinking

 
Above is just for info as may be correct or may be not but a good work till we got the best analysis.
 
O mankind, fear your Lord, who created you from one soul and created from it its mate and dispersed from both of them many men and women. And fear Allah , through whom you ask one another, and the wombs. Indeed Allah is ever, over you, an Observer.http://quran.com/4/1 
 
And do not wish for that by which Allah has made some of you exceed others. For men is a share of what they have earned, and for women is a share of what they have earned. And ask Allah of his bounty. Indeed Allah is ever, of all things, Knowing.

Source:
http://thenewagefoundation.org/profiles/blogs/human-brain-analysis-man-vs-woman-a-must-read

Human Brain Analysis – Man vs. Woman


Human Brain Analysis – Man vs. Woman


Men and Women Equality and Women

Mother the biggest gift of Allah to us:Women and Islam

http://quran.com/2/29-39

1. MULTI-TASKING

Women – Multiple process

Womens brains designed to concentrate multiple task at a time.
Women can Watch a TV and Talk over phone and cook.
Men – Single Process
Mens brains designed to concentrate only one work at a time. Men can not watch TV and talk over the phone at the same time. they stop the TV while Talking. They can either watch TV or talk over the phone or cook.

2. LANGUAGE

Women can easily learn many languages. But can not find solutions to problems. Men can not easily learn languages, they can easily solve problems. That’s why in average a 3 years old girl has three times higher vocabulary than a 3 yeard old boy.

3. ANALYTICAL SKILLS

Mens brains has a lot of space for handling the analytical process. They can analyze and find the solution for a process and design a map of a building easily. But If a complex map is viewed by women, they can not understand it. Women can not understand the details of a map easily, For them it is just a dump of lines on a paper.

4. CAR DRIVING.

While driving a car, mans analytical spaces are used in his brain. He can drive a car fastly. If he sees an object at long distance, immediately his brain classifies the object (bus or van or car) direction and speed of the object and he drives accordingly. Where woman take a long time to recognize the object direction/ speed. Mans single process mind stops the audio in the car (if any), then concentrates only on driving.

5. LYING

When men lie to women face to face, they get caught easily. Womans super natural brain observes facial expression 70%, body language 20% and words coming from the mouth 10%. Mens brain does not have this. Women easily lie to men face to face.
So guys, do not lie face to face.

6. PROBLEMS SOLVING

If a man have a lot of problems, his brain clearly classifies the problems and puts them in individual rooms in the brain and then finds the solution one by one. You can see many guys looking at the sky for a long time. If a woman has a lot of problems, her brain can not classify the problems. she wants some one to hear that. After telling everything to a person she goes happily to bed. She does not worry about the problems being solved or not.

7. WHAT THEY WANT

Men want status, success, solutions, big process, etc… But Women want relationship, friends, family, etc…

8. UNHAPPINESS

If women are unhappy with their relations, they can not concentrate on their work. If men are unhappy with their work, they can not concentrate on the relations.

9. SPEECH

Women use indirect language in speech. But Men use direct language.

10. HANDLING EMOTION

Women talk a lot without thinking. Men act a lot without thinking

 
Above is just for info as may be correct or may be not but a good work till we got the best analysis.
 
O mankind, fear your Lord, who created you from one soul and created from it its mate and dispersed from both of them many men and women. And fear Allah , through whom you ask one another, and the wombs. Indeed Allah is ever, over you, an Observer.http://quran.com/4/1 
 
And do not wish for that by which Allah has made some of you exceed others. For men is a share of what they have earned, and for women is a share of what they have earned. And ask Allah of his bounty. Indeed Allah is ever, of all things, Knowing.

Source:
http://thenewagefoundation.org/profiles/blogs/human-brain-analysis-man-vs-woman-a-must-read